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Stefano Canali
I would argue that, by now, it is safe to say that the philosophy of informationhas developed in the last few years as a proper philosophical field of research. Inthe pages of RIFAJ we followed this development in two main occasions, when weinterviewed Luciano Floridi in our second issue, in 2011, and when we reviewedFloridi’s first Italian publication, in 2013. The present report may be seen as anaddition to the two former publications and, at the same time, as a way of trying topresent a broader consideration of the philosophy of information.In spite of its young age, the philosophy of information is a broad field of re-search. It is broad not only in the sense of the topics and questions covered, butalso from the methodological perspective: within the literature, one can find workon the technical information theory and computer science, on philosophy of scienceapplied to information and digital technologies, on metaphysics and the debatesabout realism, on the ethical and societal aspects of information and communicationtechnologies, etc. This mix of different methodologies and areas of research makesfor what I think is a very vibrant and active environment, in which, moreover, sig-nificant philosophical insights can come from research which many would not evendefine as ‘philosophical’. As a further consequence of this, the approach I foundduring the workshop was open to considerations and, possibly, critiques of differentkinds.Within this broad range of topics and fields, the organisers of the workshop –Phyllis Illari and Giuseppe Primiero – decided to focus on data and its related con-ceptual challenges in science and technology. Data can be considered a traditionalsubject of research in the philosophy of science, as for instance the work of Bogenand Woodward (1988) and Hacking (1983) show, but has become a central themein more recent research, as a consequence of the increasingly important role dataplays in both science and other elements of the human society (think, for instance,
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of the importance big data and data more in general have in current discussionsabout the economy as well as policy-making). Within this framework, conceptualresearch and theoretical considerations of data can prove to be useful and relevant.Speaking of the specific talks of the workshop, here, for matters of space, I had tofocus on six presentations. In particular, I start off with the report of Emma Tobin’stalk about the classification of proteins through data. In the talk, Tobin arguedagainst traditional monism, suggesting that the case of proteins can be consideredas a new element highlighting the flaws of monism and natural kins essentialism.In order to show this point, Tobin focused on scientists’ practices of classificationthrough online databases.Similarly to Emma Tobin, Sabina Leonelli considered what scientists practicallydo with data and how they curate it on order to extract useful knowledge. In thetalk, this kind of research was extended to include what happens when somethinggoes wrong with the data and was used to argue against what can be consideredthe received view on data (i.e. data as something which is there). As a conse-quence of the problems of such received view, Leonelli proposed a new, relational,characterisation of what data is.Rob Kitchin’s talk was an especially useful one, as it clearly summed up thedifferent definitions of big data and the different views on its influence on episte-mology. In fact, in the talk Kitchin discussed the question regarding how big datais changing traditional ways of doing research in the different sciences, includingthe social sciences and the humanities, wondering whether we can really talk ofbig data as a paradigm-shift for science.Causation and its philosophical importance and characterisation was one ofthe recurring elements of the talks. Billy Wheeler considered recent views in thephilosophy of causation, according to which causation is the transfer of information,and, a part from describing the features and benefits of these, focused on a definitionof what is it that is transferred, in the sense of the best way of characterisinginformation from the perspective of causation.Within a similar framework to the one of Wheeler’s talk, Wolfgang Pietsch pre-sented his view about the epistemological challenge of big data and a consequentkind of science hugely reliant on data. In particular, Pietsch’s main goal in the talkwas proposing a specific account of causation which he finds capable of explainingcurrent data practices and debates about the use of data in science.As for the debates about the role of data in science, Teresa Scantamburlo anal-ysed the assumptions and philosophical underpinnings of disciplines where data isincreasingly central, such as machine learning and pattern recognition. In the talk,Scantamburlo argued that these assumptions are significantly similar to a Humeankind of empiricism and, in particular, its approach towards reason and theories.
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1 Data in Protein ClassificationEmma Tobin (University College London)
In her talk, Emma Tobin addresses a classical issue in philosophy of science – naturalkinds and classification (see Bird and Tobin, 2015) – and considers the specific caseof data in protein classification. In general, in the classification literature we canfind what Tobin calls a great divide. In fact, on the one hand, as a consequenceof the so-called species problem, many philosophers hold a pluralistic view on theclassification of biology: that is, since scientists have many and different ways todefine and classify species, philosophers tend to conclude that there is not a single,best, natural way of dividing animals in species (see e.g. Ereshefsky, 1998). On theother hand, chemical elements have been traditionally taken to be the instances ofthe fact that there is only one way of dividing nature, because nature has an order wecan reflect in classification; this is why many philosophers hold a monistic view onthe classification of chemistry (see e.g. Hendry, 2006). Within this framework, Tobinthinks that proteins are an interesting case, because, being biochemical entities, theylie at the interface of the divide and, thus, lead to the following question: shouldwe argue that monism can be extended to macromolecules (bottom up approach),or is there a species problem for proteins as well and we should be pluralistic (topdown approach)? This is the main question of the talk.In order to try and answer the question, Tobin starts off with a definition ofproteins. Generally, proteins are defined as <<linear chains of amino acids bondedin peptide bonds>> (Tobin, 2009), that is they are essentially defined in terms of
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amino acid sequences. As a consequence, we may think that the structure of theamino acid sequences is the criterion of the classification of proteins, thus arguingin favour of a structural kind of monism, also knows as microstructuralism. However,Tobin highlights that the problem with this position is that proteins’ structure isactually a process divided in different steps, in the sense that the amino acid se-quences are the initial primary structure which then folds in upper level structures:the path from the amino acid sequence to the folding is not always the same and, forinstance, can be affected by external elements; moreover, the amino acid sequenceis not necessarily connected to the protein’s function, as for example proteins withthe same structure do different things when in different places. Hence, according toTobin, the latter and other phenomena suggest that structures are not really a goodbasis for classification: by focusing on structure only, one would miss out on manyother features of proteins which are fundamental for classification. In other words,on Tobin’s view, microstructuralism is not a tenable position.In order to better sustain her position against microstructuralism, Tobin arguesthat it has empirical grounding: with a move typical of recent philosophy of sci-ence in practice, she focuses on the way scientists practically classify proteins. Andthis is where data comes in: as a matter of fact, currently most of the results ofthe classification work on proteins is uploaded by scientists on online databases.In particular, Tobin considers the Protein Data Bank (PDB), which is the primaryrepository of protein structures: what happens with the PDB is that scientists de-termine structures of proteins with a number of techniques and then their resultsare given an identifier and released on the database; journals require the PDBidentifier before publishing a protein discovery. As a consequence, one could ar-gue that the PDB case supports a monistic, bottom up view on proteins, in thesense that PDB identifiers are the unique and natural way of classifying proteins.Nevertheless, Tobin thinks that scientists’ practices actually suggest the opposite.In fact, the techniques scientists use in order to find out about proteins’ structureare highly indirect and do not consist in the direct imaging of the structure. Forexample, one of these techniques – X-ray crystallography – requires proteins to becrystallised, which is not possible for every protein and uses much idealisation andapproximation; after the crystallisation, the crystallised proteins are beamed by X-rays and, from the different angles and intensities of the diffracted beams scientistsdesign 3-D electron density maps. Moreover, another element of X-ray crystallog-raphy which lets us see that it is a very indirect process is the strong presence ofmathematical representation, for instance in the generation of the coordinates and3-D maps. As a consequence, Tobin argues that what we see in the PDB is notsimply the structure of the protein, as it is very idealised and dictated by contextualthings (technology, funding, etc.).Furthermore, Tobin argues that another reason why the monistic approach basedon structure is flawed is that with proteins’ classification we can find a situation
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which is similar to the one of species in biology. As a matter of fact, the PDB is theprimary but not the only and unique database for protein classification: there arehundreds of other databases, which use different criteria to classify proteins. Forinstance, the CATH database divides the protein structures of the PDB into structuraldomains, which in turn are grouped in evolutionary superfamilies; similarly, theSCOP (Structural Database of Proteins) focuses on the structural and evolutionaryrelationships between proteins of which we know the structure. The presence ofthese different database is interesting because they divide proteins differently, to theextent that certain proteins are classified in different ways in the different databases:for example, papain is considered as a single domain by SCOP, while it is split intwo domains by CATH. The presence of different criteria of classification and thefact that the same elements are classified as different kinds is very similar to thespecies problem of biology, to the point that, in Tobin’s opinion, we could argue thatthere is a species problem in proteins’ classification as well.The monist, though, could reply by highlighting that, actually, secondary databasessuch as SCOP and CATH take the data from the PDB, and could thus suggest that,metaphysically, we can be monists about protein structure and that the differentways in which data is organised reflect a data deluge problem, which is an episte-mological – not metaphysical – problem. For Tobin, the problem with this responseis that there is no agreed way of dividing the PDB data. As a matter of fact, beforeusing the secondary databases, scientists have to identify – “choose”, as scientistscall it – the so-called domains of the proteins, which are parts of the structure ca-pable of independently existing and functioning; thanks to the division in domains,scientists can reduce the complexity of the structure to simpler units. Once again,the point here is that there are different (both manual and automatic) ways of doingdomain partitioning, which itself is an indirect process relying on existing knowl-edge. More particularly, although there is a benchmarking dataset (P-Domains)measuring the consensus about the domains, scientists agree only on very simplecases: for proteins with more complex structures, domain partitioning is subjectiveand requires a choice. As a consequence, Tobin argues that the microstructuralresponse is flawed. The monist, though, may have another response, saying thatone day we will know which is the right database and the right way of classifyingproteins, it is just that we do not know it yet. However, Tobin highlights once againhow classifying proteins via structure is difficult and, crucially, the structure doesnot tell us enough about proteins themselves.Therefore, Tobin concludes that structural monism about proteins is not tenableand argues in favour of a pluralist, top down approach, similar to the one manyphilosophers hold in the case of biological species. Scientists’ practices with dataregarding proteins and databases are significant, insofar as they enlighten thispoint.
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2 Data Journeys: Openness and ShadowsSabina Leonelli (University of Exeter)
Sabina Leonelli’s talk can be seen as a way of reflecting on a foundational aspectof the philosophical framework she has recently established. As a matter of fact, inthe last few years Leonelli has focused on a philosophical consideration of data asused in the scientific practices (biology and model-organism biology in particular),highlighting their assumptions, epistemic features and more generally philosophicalrelevance (see e.g. Leonelli, 2014). Her talk begins with a consideration of the usualconceptualisation of data – i.e., data as a given –, then touches on a few of the topicsand concepts she has mostly focused on in her research (data journeys and datareuse) and, within this framework, reflects on the conceptual consequences of newissues relating data travels (data absence, shadows of data, dark data, etc.).Leonelli starts off by suggesting that the discourse around big and open dataseems to be very much connected with ideas about what is available and what arethe best ways to exploit the values of what is there. For instance, when we speakof open data, we usually speak of the ways in which we should open up data whichis already there in order to exploit its value. Similarly, big data discourse normallyinvolves issues such as the gathering, integration and analysis of data as an alreadyavailable resource. These elements are now also reflected in data policies, whoseidea is opening up e.g. government public spending in order to be more transparentand accountable about what is going on and – again – what is there. Even from anetymological perspective, data means something which is given. On this view, dataseems an entity which exists and, thus, can be used as evidence for statements ofdifferent kinds. While this, in a way, could be seen as the received view on data,Leonelli suggests that it might not be enough when it comes to the diverse activities
RIVISTAITALIANADIFILOSOFIAANALITICAJUNIOR6:1(2015)
71
Stefano Canali Seventh Workshop on the Philosophy of Information
which are now possible with data. As a matter of fact, data is not only somethingalready available, because it can actually also be made and produced under veryspecific conditions. These elements can be found in the discourse about open andbig data, insofar as data is presented as a commodity, the precious outcome oflabour and investments, but the emphasis is mostly about the subsequent passage,i.e. the access, exploitation and re-use of the data when it is made available. Is thisview of data as a given a good way of accounting for the epistemological value ofdata? Is it the only possible view?In order to find a possible answer, Leonelli suggests that we focus on databasesand data journeys. The idea, here, is that the cases of databases and data journeysare a good window for exploring data practices and the epistemological value ofdata. Leonelli has written extensively on these topics, especially by studying thedata practices of scientists working in modal-organism biology (Leonelli and Ankeny,2012) and what it takes for data to travel from the laboratory in which it is producedin the first place to new laboratories in which it can be used for possibly differentgoals. When it comes to databases, for example, this kind of research consists inlooking at the ways in which data is produced, submitted to the database, how itis curated, visualised and made searchable so that as many scientists as possiblecan reuse it. Why are these practices interesting from the perspective of philosophyof science? Because the study of data practices reveals the epistemic conditionsunder which data can travel and be used as evidence for scientific claims; suchepistemic conditions include the way in which data is donated and/or submitted tothe database, the institutional support for curators, the conditions and presence ofthe infrastructures (databases, but also data-journals), the packaging competencesand technologies (the procedures of cleaning, selecting, mining data and organisingit through common formats, metadata, labels and visualising tools), etc. That is,the research on the data practices of scientists highlights the complexities of data-travelling and the possible problems affecting it.Having summed up the most important elements of her research on data travelsand their conditions, Leonelli turns to consider situations in which data is not there,is not given, but can nonetheless represent a useful piece of information and beused for good scientific research. What happens in these cases and how should weconceptualise data so that we can understand them? For instance, data may be:missing or incomplete; negative, i.e. data giving you evidence for something whichis not there, for the absence of some phenomenon; unobtainable, e.g. because oflack of resources or costs; unreliable, e.g. produced in non-reproducible conditions;invisible or ignored, e.g. not seen as relevant data by the curators and thus notcirculated; untagged and unclassified, i.e. unusable because it is not retrievable;unintelligible, e.g. data about an organism about which there is no previous knowl-edge; inaccessible, e.g. because it is private or confidential; immobile, i.e. it cannotbe made to move because of, for instance, costs, lack of infrastructure (e.g. a very
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big archive which cannot be digitalised and thus has to stay in a place); loss ormissed, e.g. where the labels, tags and other packaging features fail completely.When thinking about data journeys and the latter forms of data absence, Leonelliargues that a few general considerations can be drawn: the epistemic role of data,the extent to which it is going to be useful to produce knowledge, is heavily depen-dent on how data has been organised, processed, disseminated and contextualisedand on whether it gets missed, stuck, abandoned, etc.; that is, data journeys affectwhat does and does not count as data and for whom. So, which kind of conceptual-isation of data can capture the previous considerations? According to Leonelli, weshould completely give up on conceptualisation based on manipulation: for instance,Ian Hacking (1983) proposed to consider data as whatever comes out of the machinesin the lab; the problem with this view, for Leonelli, is that often what we consider asdata does not come out of usual laboratory machines (e.g. data can be the result ofsimulations). Equally, we should also give up a notion of data based on its intrinsicproperties, i.e. data as representations of some kind that can be used independentlyof the context. Leonelli proposes a different way to conceptualise data: we shouldthink of data as any product of research activities which is collected, stored anddisseminated in order to be used as evidence for knowledge claims; that is, data isa relational concept, because any object may be – and shift to become – data aslong as it fulfils the previous features. In this relational sense, Leonelli argues thatwe can better understand the epistemology of data and why data can be useful evenwhen it is absent: data should not be considered as an immutable commodity (as,for instance, Latour (1986) does), something which is relevant only if it is there andis given; the relevance of data can change and the change depends on the journeys,the relations established with the data.
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3 Big Data, New Epistemologies and Paradigm ShiftsRob Kitchin (National University of Ireland Maynooth)
In his talk, Rob Kitchin addresses one of the big questions which regards big dataand comes up in different forms and with different levels of depth in other talks.The question is about the way in which big data is changing epistemology: arewe witnessing a paradigm shift as a consequence of big data? In other words,is big data a revolution on the epistemological level, is it challenging establishedepistemologies? Positive answers to these questions can often be found in theliterature as well as in more general discussions about big data: for instance, Gray(see Hey, et al. 2010) argues that revolutions in science are usually preceded byrevolutions regarding measurement and Boyd and Crawford (2012: 665) suggestthat big data <<is a profound change at the levels of epistemology and ethics>>.Kitchin’s talk intends to critically assess these views.First of all, what is big data? Usually, big data is defined in terms of threedimensions (see e.g. Beyer and Laney, 2012), that is in terms of the high volumeand variety of the data collected and the high velocity of the collection. However,in Kitchin’s opinion this definition is not enough and it is necessary to considerother specific features of big data, which stand out in comparison with small data:big data is exhaustive, in the sense that it can capture entire domains and doesnot need samples; it has a high level of resolution and is indexical in identification;it is strong in relationality and capable of conjoining different sets; it is highlyflexible and scalable (see Kitchin, 2014: 1). As for practical examples, big datais, for instance, the number of transactions collected by supermarkets, or, in thecontext of cities, big data is the result of collecting data in a direct and manual(e.g. CCTV), automated (e.g. phones automatically sending data to providers) orfreely volunteered (e.g. wearable devices, social media) way. So, what can be donewith big data? As a consequence of its features, big data is necessarily messy andunstructured data and needs to be analysed to be useful: in order to analyse thedata, what is used are techniques of machine learning, capable of automaticallymining the data, finding the patterns and making predictions.So, do big data and automated analytics imply a new paradigm-shift in sci-ence? In order to reply, Kitchin begins with Kuhn, who famously introduced thenotion of scientific paradigm and paradigm-shift, in the sense of the historical mo-ment in which an accepted set of theories, notions, experimental techniques andmethodologies, etc. – a paradigm – declines and is changed in favour of a new one.According to Gray (see Hey et al., 2009), Kuhn’s notion of paradigm-shift shouldbe applied to the case of measurements: that is, real paradigm-shifts in sciencetake place when the nature of data and the analysis concerning data change; inparticular, Gray identifies three main paradigms in the history of science and ar-gues that with big data we have entered a fourth paradigm. What is this fourth
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paradigm? According to many, it is a radical form of empiricism: the idea is that,thanks to the automated analysis of a huge amount of data, it is not necessary toactively engage with data through theory because data can speak for itself. Forinstance, this is what Chris Anderson (2008) thinks, when he argues that big dataimplies <<the end of theory>>. But, why and how is big data sufficient? Thepoint is that the computational power of automated analytics makes it possible toapply an ensemble approach, which consists in using every type of algorithms andsee which one is the best and works, while normally scientists would choose andapply only one method. As a consequence, the idea here is that the answers weget from the ensemble approach are better, because they are not subject to thebiases of humans choosing one analytical method, and are objective explanations,because they are not the subjective applications of a theory. As a consequence,big data are enough because its patterns and correlations give us answers that arenot subject to human biases and theories: there is no need for any a priori model,hypothesis or subjective choice, as the patterns of the data are always useful andtrue, value-free and universal, to the point you just need data-scientists or softwarerather than domain experts. In Kitchin’s opinion, these ideas regarding big dataand epistemology are powerful and fascinating, but are not free of flaws and can becriticised. As a matter of fact, first of all, the idea of big data as capturing whole do-mains is flawed, because, even if data is big, it still remains a sample: for example,Twitter is a very big and quite inclusive kind of sample, but it is still a sample as noteveryone is on Twitter. As a consequence, big data is not free of any bias, since itis at least subject to sampling bias. Moreover, the fact that algorithms are capableof making automatic discoveries does not entail that discoveries are theory-free orthat the data speaks for itself: algorithms are designed by humans, who rely onscientific theories and act in certain contexts with certain values. Linked with theprevious points, it is not either true that data can speak for itself and be meaningfulindependently of the context in which it was generated and to which its patternsrefer.In contrast to the former forms of radical empiricism and their problems, Kitchinargues that a different view on the epistemology of big data can be found, i.e.data-driven science: data-driven science can be considered as a mixed approach,according to which one can start off with an initial exploration of the data only, bysearching for correlations and patterns and generating hypotheses from the datarather than the theory; theory, however, guides the whole process, at the level ofchoosing the algorithms, the most interesting correlations and patterns, etc. Theidea, then, is a sort of mix between induction, used to generate hypotheses fromthe data, abduction, used to guide the formulation of hypotheses, and deduction,used to assess the validity of hypotheses. As such, one could argue that data-driven science is a new scientific paradigm, because it is a new way of generatingknowledge starting from the data. Presented in this way, hence, data-driven science
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is very different from the ideas of data speaking for itself and the end of theory andthe point is that the revolutionary epistemology of big data consists in this initialexploration, which informs the generation of scientific hypotheses.After having analysed what he thinks are the two main epistemologies relatedto big data – empiricism and data-driven science –, Kitchin switches to consideringspecific disciplines where the application of big data epistemologies does not seemso straightforward: the social sciences and humanities. In these two broad disci-plines, traditionally there is not much statistical analysis and, even where quan-titative methods are traditionally used, as in economics, political science, humangeography, sociology, etc., more recently there has been a move towards qualitativeapproaches.Hence, can big data be applied to the social sciences and the humanities? Asfor the social sciences, big data is seen as an opportunity by positivistic socialscientists (who think that the scientific method can be used to study and explainsocial phenomena): in fact, thanks to big data, social scientists are able to designsocial models that are much finer-grained and wider-scale; all of this can be used bypositivistic scholars to respond to the classical critiques and issues of their views,such as reductionism and universalism. However, big data is an opportunity forpost-positivistic social scientists as well, for example because of the presence of ahuge amount of new (e.g. social media) or previously inaccessible (e.g. digitalisedarchives) data. At the same time, though, big data poses challenges: carrying outmechanistic analyses seems too simple for many cases; social trends may not entailcauses, thus not being very useful; in big data there is a lot of what, but not muchhow; big data is sometimes seen as a treat to certain expertise not based on data.In similar ways, big data is both an opportunity and a challenge for the humanities,in particular in the form of so-called digital humanities. Kitchin argues that, inthe digital humanities, one can find two main approaches to the role of big data:according to some scholars, big data and related technologies bring methodologicalrigour and objectivity to disciplines which were previously lacking them; on the otherhand, others think that big data epistemologies can improve current methodologies,of which they may become a sort of extension, but not a replacement. Consideringthe challenges of big data, many highlight how big data methods may make thehumanities mechanist and reductionist, sacrificing depth for width. Hence, the useof big data and related analytics in the social sciences and the humanities seemsmore complex than it is for the other sciences. An additional and specific challengeconcerning both the fields regards the role of small data: in this picture, whathappens to small data, on which these fields have successfully been based up untilnow? It is difficult to think that big data methodologies will entirely replace ordelete the study and use of small data, which have a proven track record of givingpowerful insights. Moreover, most of big data was not originally produced to besubject of research in the social sciences or humanities: for example, Twitter data
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was never produced to give information about health. This means that most of bigdata needs to be re-purposed (this has problems to be solved, see e.g. Illari, 2014)and, in addition, that big data can provide an interesting but surface snapshot,opposite to the very specific and deep insights which are the goal of small dataresearch. However, Kitchin thinks it will increasingly be possible to apply big datamethodologies to small data as a consequence of the sharing, opening up, reusingpolicies which scale the infrastructure of small data.So, concluding his talk, Kitchin draws a few general conclusions about big dataand its consequences on the scientific epistemologies. In his opinion, big dataand related analytics are a disruptive kind of technology, insofar as, by radicallyaltering the nature of data, they broaden the objects of research and provide new andpowerful ways to analyse phenomena. As such, thus, there is no doubt that big datais capable of influencing and radically changing the epistemologies of the sciences;at the same time, big data poses new social, political and ethical questions. As forepistemology, the big question is how precisely big data is going to change the wayswe do science, and the talk has consequently focused on critically assess ideas onhow this change may take place. For the sciences, the radically empiricist approachof the end of theory and data speaking for itself is quite popular in many discussions,but seems to be flawed; on the other hand and as a consequence of flaws of theempiricist approach, the data-driven one seems more promising and likely to winout in the long run as a new paradigm. As for the social sciences and humanities,the application of big data is more complex and, while big data surely offers manysignificant opportunities to these disciplines, it seems difficult that the current andestablished epistemologies, based on small data, will be replaced; probably, bigdata lead to more pluralistic approaches. Therefore, the question about whetherbig data is going to establish a new in the sciences remains an open question, butKitchin’s guess is that more pluralistic and “mixed” approaches will be the ones tostand out.
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4 Causation and Information: What is Transferred?Billy Wheeler
In his talk, Billy Wheeler considers the recent philosophical view on causation,according to which causation, in the world, is actually the transfer of information;in his opinion, this is a promising view on the philosophical level and the practicalone, especially for the design of algorithms and analytical methods for data.The starting point of Wheeler’s talk is the so-called Conserved Quantities View(CQV). Usually, when we think of causation, we tend to think of relations betweenevents in time; the CQV takes a different approach, focusing on causal processesrather than events and suggesting that causal processes (in contrast with pseudoprocesses, see Salmon, 1977) are those processes which possess a conserved quan-tity (e.g. charge, momentum, etc.). That is, for example, considering the charge ofan object, we can speak of a causal process between t(1) and t(2) if the charge hasbeen conserved between t(1) and t(2). Within the CQV, then, the traditional way ofthinking of causation as the interaction between two things producing something isexplained in terms of the exchange of the conserved quantity between two causalprocesses. While the view is good for a number of reasons, two big problems havebeen highlighted in the literature: we often invoke the absence of an object or aprocess as a cause of something (e.g. not watering plants causes their death), butit is difficult to see how there can be exchange of a conserved quantity with anabsent object or process; secondly, the CQV has an issue of applicability to thespecial sciences (and, consequently, their datasets), because in the latter very fewquantities are governed by a conservation law. These issues can be seen as themotivation for a new version of the CQV and, in particular, an information-basedview of causation; this has firstly been proposed by Krajewski (1997) and morerecently by Collier (2011) and Illari and Russo (2014). The basic idea of the view,which Wheeler calls i-CQV, is that what is conserved in causal processes is infor-mation. The advantages of the view is that, by using information as a reference, the
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problems affecting the CQV are potentially solved: as for the problem of absence,in information theory absence can be data and thus a piece of information (e.g. thefact that the alarm clock has not ring yet is itself a piece of information, notifyingthat the pie is not ready); as for applicability, information is a more general conceptcompared to physical quantities and can be applied to the special sciences and awider number of cases. In addition, the fact that we deal with information makesthe i-CQV a more suitable concept for, possibly, writing algorithms searching forcausation in data.Thus, i-CQV seems a very useful and interesting way of treating causation. But,if causation is really the transfer of information, what is information? What is it thatwe measure as a conserved quantity? Having defined the i-CQV and highlighted itspotential benefits, Wheeler switches to considering these questions about the natureof information and, specifically, he analyses three notions of information: informationas ‘knowledge update’, information as ‘entropy’ and information as ‘computationalcomplexity’. Wheeler states that he is not an advocate of any of these views inparticular, as he has not made a decision about which is the best one, and thathis consideration is not aimed at assessing these notions in themselves as views ofinformation, but rather as for how good they are for analysing causation.So, the first concept Wheeler considers is the idea of information as a knowledgeupdate. This seems the notion of information which is presupposed by epistemiclogic, i.e. the idea that an agent has a number of hypotheses about how the worldis and, every time she learns something new and gains knowledge, her range ofhypotheses goes down; this notion of information is probably the most intuitive andthe closest to our ordinary use of the term ‘information’, the idea that, when youare informed of something, this changes the way you see the world. Moreover, itis a qualitative theory and gives a semantic notion of information. But, is this viewgood for analysing causation? In other words, how would information be conservedwithin this view? Wheeler suggests that, here, the most natural suggestion wouldbe in the following terms: the sum total of updates received by the agent from A andB at a time t(1) is conserved insofar as it equals the sum total of updates receivedby the agent from A and B at time t(2). Would this work? Wheeler thinks that thereare problems. Firstly, on this view knowledge can only be updated once: once theagent learns something new, the range of hypotheses goes down and, if you learnsomething new again, there is no more change in range; we could solve the issuethrough counterfactuals (“the agent gets a knowledge update at time t(2); however,if she had had exposure to that information at time t(1), her range reduction wouldhave been equal to what it would have been at t(2)”), but this may create problemsof circularity when analysing causation and the CQV itself has been criticised in thepast because of its reliance on counterfactuals. The second problem is that a person’srange of hypotheses may change between t(1) and t(2) and the information acquiredat t(2) may be different depending on what she has learnt between t(1) and t(2) (e.g.
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it might be less or more informative and the agent might exclude or include differenthypotheses); a possible solution – using an Hintikka approach on time fixing – wouldmake the view useless for conservation. Thirdly, the knowledge update conception ofinformation also presents the issue of the influence of background beliefs; definingan ideal agent might be the solution here, but it would be very arbitrary. As aconsequence of these three issues, Wheeler argues that this view is hard to defend.The second concept of information Wheeler considers in his talk is the onebased on entropy, which comes from Shannon’s mathematical theory of communi-cation (Shannon and Weaver, 1949). According to this view, the informativeness ofa message is defined in terms of the uncertainty that is resolved at the end of thereceiver. As such, this notion has been vastly influential and is philosophically inter-esting, as we can think of causal processes as Shannon’s communication channels.More specifically, a possible way to think of the conservation of information from theperspective of entropy may be arguing that the sum total of uncertainty resolved atpoints A and B at time t(1) equals the sum total of uncertainty resolved at A and Bat t(2). Would this concept work? Wheeler thinks that it is better than the previousone, but it still has problems. Firstly, it requires an intervention, in the sense that itrequires the presence of a receiver intervening to receive a message in a channel;interventions are problematic because they may already presuppose a concept ofcausation, but Wheeler is not sure as to whether measuring entropy really countsas an intervention or not. This problem might be overcome by defining entropy aschoice of a source rather than a receiving end, but that is problematic if you want tomeasure at each stage of the process and not just at the beginning. A second objec-tion to this view may be that it just reduces to the familiar definition of causation interms of probability; a possible response to that would be that this is a probabilis-tic account which is very different from the traditional Reichenbach-inspired viewsof causation as raising of chances, but, in any case, talking of probability wouldprobably require an interpretation of probability itself.The last notion Wheeler talks about is the computational complexity view, alsoknown as algorithm or Kolmogorov complexity. This is the idea that the informa-tiveness of a message is equal to the sum total of computational resources that isrequired to produce that message and goes back to Kolmogorov and Solomonoff’swork in the 1960s. A possible way in which this could work within the i-CQV isthat the sum total of computational resources required at time t(1) equals the sumtotal of computational resources used to describe A and B at t(2). This seems theconcept of information that Collier (1999) presupposes in his work, as his idea isthat what is transferred is essentially the amount of complexity. Moreover, thisview has significant advantages: interventions are not necessary, as any particularpoint in a world line can have a fixed amount of information expressed in terms ofcomputational resources; interpretations of probability are not necessary either; inaddition, the notion is general enough to be applied to the causal process of all
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scientific fields and very suitable to be used as a basis for designing algorithms tosearch for causality in big data.Wheeler does not think that there are major problems with this view, but thererather is an open question: if we want to measure complexity by measuring thelength of computational resources, we have to measure data; then, what is the datain the causal process? We could say that it does not really matter: we could measuredata in any language and the difference in length of complexity would not matter,because the invariance theorem of complexity theory shows that any structuralfeature demonstrated from encoding in one language is automatically going to holdin another language. The problem with this, though, is that, if we change languagebetween t(1) and and t(2), complexity will not be conserved but this will not implythat causation does not take place. A second way of thinking about complexity isin physical terms, as Collier does when he argues that for physical systems it isenergy which is conserved. The problems with this proposal is that, as we havealready seen, energy does not seem to work outside the physical sciences; Collier(1999) responds to that by saying that it does not matter, since each field will haveits own interpretation of substance, but the response is problematic as well becausein many fields the interpretation is not obvious and, anyway, inter-field causationwould be impossible. Hence, as a consequence of all these problems, Wheelerargues that we should go for a radical view, according to which the physical worldis not basic, but is emergent out of a more basic reality which is computationaland, thus, physical processes are actually computational processes; this is the vieworiginally given by John Archibald Wheeler as the “it from bit” hypothesis, sometimescalled digital realism. The best mathematical model for this view is the concept of‘cellular automata’ developed by Wolfram (2002): the idea is taking causal processesas series of computations in the basic cells and, then, defining information as thelength of the program in the operating language of those cellular automata; inthis way, the language is fixed by the identification of a transcendent operatingsystem. Of course, Wheeler does not suggest that this rules out significant questionsabout this view, which could as well be considered crazy and making metaphysicalassumptions going beyond basic empiricist constraints; other problems regard howwe know the basic operating language of the cellular automata and the fact thatthe idea of programs running the automata seems very similar to the idea of lawsof nature and we would thus need a definition of causation based on laws, whichmight be problematic as well. Nevertheless, the it from bit hypothesis may prove tobe the best way to describe what is really transferred during causal processes.
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5 Difference-Making as a Notion of Causation for Data-Intensive ScienceWolgang Pietsch (Technische Universität München)
The basic question of Wolfgang Pietsch’s research concerns the way the relianceon data and related technologies in science is changing the methodology of scienceitself. According to many, as highlighted in Kitchin’s talk, scientific methodologyhas changed towards a new kind of science, where data is a sufficient guide thanksto its massive availability: scientists just need to analyse the data and look forcorrelations, so that they do not need theories, because data can per se tell useverything, and do not need to find causation, because correlations are enough.A good synthesis of these positions can be found in Anderson (2008), who arguesthat <<the new availability of huge amounts of data, along with the statisticaltools to crunch these numbers, offers a whole new way of understanding the world.Correlation supersedes causation, and science can advance even without coherentmodels, unified theories, or really any mechanistic explanation at all>>. Accordingto Pietsch, it is quite easy to debunk statement such as the one of Anderson and,in fact, this has largely been done in the literature (see e.g. Boyd and Crawford,2012); however, the real challenge to philosophy of science is identifying the grain oftruth rather than simply debunking, because there may be some truth under theseexaggerated positions.First of all, Pietsch reflects on the very idea of big data. What is big datain the first place? As explained in Kitchin’s talk, the usual definition of big data
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is the 3V definition. Similarly to Kitchin, Pietsch thinks that this definition maybe considered problematic, because it uses relational concepts only and thus onewould need to clarify the specific point of the volume/variety/velocity. In additionand more importantly, the definition mostly refers to the technical challenges ofbig data and, hence, is not really useful for analysing data-intensive science andmethodological elements. A possibly more useful way of defining big data deals withthe idea that there is something happening to sampling, in the sense that thanks tobig data we no longer need to choose a specific sample because we the data mayrepresent all – or at least a significant subset of – the configurations of phenomena.Another crucial aspect of big data definitions which are useful for understanding thescientific use of data regards the automation of scientific processes. For example,Jim Gray (Hey et al., 2009: xvii-xix) argues that the availability of a huge amount ofdata and data-handling technologies enables scientists to ask questions about moregenerally as well as causally complex. As for the issues this kind of data-intensivescience deals with and the ways it solves them, Pietsch thinks that it is mostlyabout predictions, many instances of observations and thus variables, nonparametricmodelling. These issues are similar to the ones of statistics, for which the presenceof big data poses many challenges and produces significant changes: this is why,according to Pietsch, there is currently a paradigm-shift developing in statistics.So, what happens to causation in the light of data-driven methods? Against thenaive idea of causality being superseded by correlations as a consequence of bigdata, Pietsch wants to propose an account of causality which is capable of dealingwith data-intensive science and/or is useful to analyse the methods of data-intensivescience. In order to do that, an account of causality should meet a few requirements:it should fit the variational nature of evidence; it should not require a strong notionof intervention, because data has usually an observation-based nature; it should insome way account for the intuition that data-intensive science is theory-free, or atleast suggest a new role for theory in inductive rather than deductive terms (this isone of the reasons Pietsch thinks that mechanist accounts of causation, here, mayhave problems); it should account for the contextuality of causation. So, Pietschbegins with a basic idea of counterfactuals, firstly formulated by Hume (1739: 70),according to whom, <<if the first object had not been, the second never had ex-isted>> and then specified by Lewis in terms of a causal chain of events of which,if one had not happened, the other would not have happened either, and in termsof the semantic framework of possible worlds, to evaluate the truth-values of thecounterfactuals’ conditionals (see Menzies, 2014). As a consequence, the accountof causation that Pietsch presents is a difference-making account which, inspiredby Mill’s method of difference (see Pietsch, 2014), is based on the counterfactualidea and also includes a notion of causal irrelevance, introduces context depen-dence. While the notion of causal irrelevance does not play a substantial role in thephilosophical discussion on causation, Pietsch thinks that it is a powerful tool; for
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instance, causal irrelevance is useful for the evaluation of counterfactuals and in thecontext of analogical inference and probabilistic independence. The account is pre-sented as follows: “in the context B in which the conditions C and the phenomena Aoccur, C is causally relevant to A if and only if the following counterfactual holds, ifC had not occured, A would not have occured either”; ‘in the context B in which theconditions C and the phenomena A occur, C is causally irrelevant to A if and onlyif the following counterfactual holds, if C had not occured, A would still have oc-cured”. As for the context dependence, the context needs to be constant in the sensethat only the causally irrelevant elements may change. As for the counterfactu-als’ evaluation, Pietsch suggest that the two main traditional evaluation methods –Goodman’s one and the more popular one by Lewis, based on the similarity betweenpossible worlds – should be ditched in favour of this different approach, inspired bythe method of difference, relying on causal irrelevance: the comparisons does nottake place between possible worlds, but rather between phenomena which in theworld differ only in terms of the causally irrelevant circumstances. According toPietsch, this account of causation fits quite well with what is currently happeningin data-intensive methods: as a matter of fact, in data-intensive science what hap-pens is that, as a consequence of the huge amount of data, instances are comparedbetween the data and the goal is getting predictions from that. Furthermore, thisaccount fulfils well the previous conditions of adequacy, insofar as it fits the varia-tional nature of evidence, does not rely on a strong notion of intervention, does notuse underling knowledge of mechanisms and explains the importance of contextual-ity. As a practical example of application of this notion to a case in data-intensivescience, Pietsch mentions the usage of the algorithms of classification trees, whichin some simple cases is identical to the method of difference and, in more compli-cated ones, is significantly similar (for instance, the condition of the stableness ofcontext is equally required).
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6 Big Data: The Empiricist Approach and Its Philo-sophical UnderpinningsTeresa Scantamburlo (University of Ca’ Foscari, Venice)
Teresa Scantamburlo’s talk looks at the philosophical underpinnings of the currentscholarship in machine learning and pattern recognition for big data analysis, sug-gesting that they are very much related to traditional empiricism.First of all, Scantamburlo starts off with a definition of big data. As standsout from the other talks, defining big data is a main issue within current academicwork and often scholars, before even arguing something about big data, have tospecify the definition they think is the best one. In this case, Scantamburlo es-sentially agrees with Rob Kitchin’s broad definition of big data (volume, velocity,variety, exhaustivity, resolution and indexicality, relationality, flexibility) and con-trasts it with Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and Kenneth Cukier (2013)’s view, whichshe thinks syntheses well the main trends of current machine learning views. Asa matter of fact, according to Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, the most importantand characterising features of big data are the following: the possibility of seeingphenomena from several angels and perspectives; the fact that you can get a senseof the main general directions of phenomena; the superiority of predictions basedon correlations as opposed to explanations and causation. In addition to Kitchin’sview, Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier’s points can be considered similar to whatBoyd and Crawford (2012) call mythologies of big data, including the idea that bigdata entails the end of theory because data can speak for itself and the triumph ofcorrelations over causation. Scantamburlo highlights how, for Boyd and Crawford,most of these ideas regarding big data are, precisely, mythologies and, for instance,claims of objectivity are misleading, bigger data is not necessarily better data, bigdata is not always universal and loses meaning when out of context and has oftenlimited access.As a consequence of the latter and other critiques regarding the myths of bigdata, Scantamburlo believes that we are currently witnessing a sort of reconciliation,somehow trying to recombine the radical empiricist approach according to whichdata can speak for itself, correlations are enough, etc. with theoretical models and,
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more in general, the sphere of reason; this alternative approach is what has beendefined as data-driven science. On Scantamburlo’s view, the efforts of reconcilingdata and theory can be seen as a sort of solution of Hume’s division between reasonand matters of fact. In other words, Scantamburlo thinks that, while we are trying tofind an alternative and critical way of looking at big data, this alternative way is anopposition to Hume’s notion of induction; at the same time, in fact, the developmentof big data analysis and machine learning is the result of a Humean view of inductionand distinction between different kinds of knowledge. That is, looking at the bigdata discourse from a Humean perspective can enlighten the roots of the discourseand let us better understand why data is increasingly trusted, while at the sametime being unreasonable (see Halevy et al., 2009).So, according to Scantamburlo, certain features of the big data discourse canbe better understood by analysing their philosophical underpinnings and, particu-larly, having Hume’s anti-rationalist approach in mind. Hume introduced an idea ofinduction based on probable reasoning and regularity, in the sense that we knowthe world just by repeating experiences and it is a spontaneous process that wetend to naturally trust. This is the main way in which machine learning and pat-tern recognition developed the idea of inductive inference: you have some instancesthat you have observed, and this is useful insofar as, when a new instance occurs,you can make a prediction on it. Statistical learning theory basically repeats thesame story: an algorithm takes some training examples on a particular target andthen, after the training phase, each time a test instance appears, through a mappingfunction the algorithm can predict its outcome. Interestingly, this way of thinkingabout inductions has led machine learning and patter recognition researchers tothink of models of data as if they were models of phenomena, to the point thatdata analysis models are seen as equivalen to theoretical and scientific models;the problem, though, is that data analysis models comprise a limited knowledge ofphenomena, while theoretical models are more general because they directly referto phenomena.So, having highlighted the two Humean philosophical underpinnings of the con-ception of induction in machine learning and pattern recognition and taking theseinto account, Scantamburlo suggest two main questions which remain open andneed further research. The first one regards the way in which we should considerinduction itself in these two disciplines: the two main approaches – abstraction andgeneralisation – are correlated, but are not really the same; in the machine learningad pattern recognition literature, though, they are often treated as if they were thesame and, as a consequence, it is often difficult to distinguish them and understandtheir conclusions and results. Secondly, Scantamburlo argues that another questionregards how we can use machine learning and pattern recognition algorithms formodels of data and models of phenomena, without making confusion between thetwo of them.
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